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15. 2024 05 30 IA reports issued

North Ayrshire Council · 30 May 2024
Back to Audit and Scrutiny Committee — 30 May 2024 and its agenda

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NORTH AYRSHIRE COUNCIL
30 May 2024                                                                                                                                                            
Audit and Scrutiny Committee
Title: Internal Audit Reports issued
Purpose: To inform the Committee of the findings of Internal Audit work
completed between March and April 2024.
Recommendation: That the Committee considers the outcomes from the Internal
Audit work completed.
1. Executive Summary
1.1 The Council's local Code of Corporate Governance requires effective arrangements to
be put in place for the objective review of risk management and internal control. 
Internal Audit is an important element in this framework as it reviews internal controls
and offers Elected Members and officers an objective and independent appraisal of
how effectively resources are being managed.
1.2 The remit of the Audit and Scrutiny Committee includes the monitoring of Internal
Audit activity.  The submission and consideration of regular reports assists the
Committee in fulfilling this remit.
2. Background
2.1 This report provides information on Internal Audit work completed between March and
April 2024.  Internal control reviews have been completed in respect of the areas
detailed in Appendix 1 to this report. The aim of these reviews is to provide assurance
that the internal control framework within the areas examined is appropriate and
operating effectively.
2.2 The findings from each audit assignment have been notified in writing to the Chief
Executive, the Section 95 Officer and the relevant Executive Director and Head of
Service on the completion of each assignment.  Where appropriate, this has included
an action plan with recommendations for improving internal control.  Appendix 1
includes the report and action plan from each audit.
2.3 The findings from three separate audit assignments are detailed at Appendix 1 to this
report and the levels of assurance for each are noted in the table below:

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Audit Title Assurance Level
Procurement Cards Substantial
Cyber Resilience Business Continuity Reasonable/Limited
Ayrshire Growth Deal – Revenue Projects Substantial 
3. Proposals 
3.1 It is proposed that the Committee considers the outcomes from the Internal Audit work
completed between March and April 2024. 
4. Implications/Socio-economic Duty 
Financial 
4.1 None. 
Human Resources 
4.2 None. 
Legal 
4.3 None. 
Equality/Socio-economic 
4.4 None. 
Climate Change and Carbon 
4.5 None. 
Key Priorities 
4.6 The work of Internal Audit helps to support the efficient delivery of the strategic
priorities within Our Council Plan 2023-2028. 
Community Wealth Building 
4.7 None. 
5. Consultation 
5.1 The relevant Services are consulted on Internal Audit findings during each audit
assignment.

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Mark Boyd
Head of Service (Finance) 
For further information please contact Laura Miller, Senior Manager (Audit, Fraud, Safety
and Risk), on 01294 324524. 
Background Papers
None.

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PROCUREMENT CARDS 
1 Background  
1.1 When procurement cards are used in line with Council guidance they provide a
number of benefits to both Services and the Council as a whole.  These include:-
• significant time savings from processing less purchase orders and invoices
• one payment per month per card, from the council to the bank eliminating
multiple payments
• reduction in petty cash purchases and cash holdings
• opportunity to purchase items at lower cost through internet
• clear audit trails. 
2 Objectives and Scope  
2.1 The objective of this audit was to ensure:-
• The number of cards in issue is being controlled and reviewed
• Access to imprest (cash) is controlled, and not automatically granted to all
cardholders
• Transactions are being reviewed and approved timeously. 
3 Findings  
3.1 In 2023 all Services were instructed to review and, if necessary, rationalise the
number of procurement cards allocated to their officers.  
3.2 eProcurement also carried out a review of the data within SDOL in 2023.   
Cardholders  
3.3 All applications for a procurement card must be made via an eform.  Within the
eform:-
• Applicants must confirm they have completed online procurement card
training 
• Applicants must confirm if the imprest function requires to be activated on
the card
• Applicants must detail the type of purchases they intend to make with the
card and (if applicable) imprest
• Applications must be approved by an officer of Grade 14 or above, with
the exception of HSCP officers who have their applications approved by
the Head of Service (HSCP Finance & Transformation).  
3.4 The above controls ensure that only those with a genuine business need are
approved for a procurement card.  
3.5 A comparison of the number of cardholders between February 2024 and March
2023 confirmed an overall reduction in the number of procurement cards from
360 to 295.  All Services have either maintained or reduced the number of cards
allocated to their officers.  The following table summarises the comparison
results:-

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Imprest  
3.6 Activating the imprest function allows a cardholder to withdraw cash using their
procurement card.  
3.7 Cardholders are not automatically granted access to this function – it must be
requested, justified and approved.  For new cardholders this is done as part of
the application process (as detailed in 3.3 above).  For existing cardholders, the
request is made via email.  
3.8 Audit reviewed the number of cards with the imprest function activated in
February 2024 as compared to March 2023.  
3.9 The number of cards with the imprest function activated has increased over the
review period from 91 in March 2023 to 119 in February 2024.  
3.10 Audit discussed this increase with eProcurement. eProcurement explained that
the number of imprest users reported as at March 2023 is artificially low.  Whilst
preparing user reports for Services to review, an issue with the recording of
cardholder function access was identified.  Reports were not flagging a number of
imprest users as having the function when they did, in fact, have it.  
3.11 eProcurement immediately reviewed all cardholders records and updated as
necessary. This update resulted in a revised figure of 130 imprest users.  Reports
were not circulated to Services until this exercise was complete.  
3.12 Audit selected a sample of 10 users who have been given imprest status in
SDOL between March 2023 and February 2024 for detailed review.  
3.13 5 of the 10 were genuine new imprest users.  Audit reviewed the application
process for each of these users.  All stages of the process as set out in 3.7 have
been completed and documented.  
3.14 The remaining 5 were not genuine new users but were picked up as such by
Audit testing due to the error noted in 3.11.  For each of these users, Audit
ensured the report provided to Services for review was reflecting the true access
status of the user.   No issues were noted during testing.

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Monitoring  
3.15 Card transactions are not posted to Integra until they have been both reviewed
(by the cardholder) and approved (by the approver) in SDOL. Delays in this
approval process can impact on budget monitoring.  
3.16 Every month emails are sent to all reviewers and approvers reminding them of
the need to review or approve any outstanding transactions.  
3.17 In addition, eProcurement produce a quarterly report of outstanding transactions
for circulation to senior managers. Managers are responsible for reviewing this
report and taking action to address any issues highlighted.  
3.18 Audit obtained details of all outstanding transactions as at 4 January 2024 and
calculated the age of the transaction per Directorate. The following table
summarises these results:-   
3.19 Based on the above, most transactions are being both reviewed and approved
within the first 50 days. 
3.20 The number of transactions outstanding for more than 50 days has reduced over
the review period – in January 2024 there were 449 outstanding as compared to
767 in March 2023. 
3.21 Imprest withdrawals remain outstanding on SDOL until the cash has been spent
in full.  This will account for some of the transactions outstanding for more than
50 days, and is not necessarily reflective of poor transaction management. 
4 Internal Audit Opinion  
4.1 Overall, substantial assurance was obtained with regard the controls surrounding
the issuing and ongoing monitoring of procurement cards.

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Definitions of Assurance Levels: 
Substantial
A sound system of governance, risk management and control exist, with
internal controls operating effectively and being consistently applied to
support the achievement of objectives in the area audited.
Reasonable
There is a generally sound system of governance, risk management and
control in place. Some issues, non-compliance or scope for
improvement were identified which may put at risk the achievement of
objectives in the area audited.
Limited
Significant gaps, weaknesses or non-compliance were identified.
Improvement is required to the system of governance, risk management
and control to effectively manage risks to the achievement of objectives
in the area audited.
None
Immediate action is required to address fundamental gaps, weaknesses
or non-compliance identified. The system of governance, risk
management and control is inadequate to effectively manage risks to the
achievement of objectives in the area audited. 
NB The level of assurance given is at the discretion of Internal Audit.

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CYBER RESILIENCE BUSINESS CONTINUITY 
1 Background  
1.1 Business continuity was last audited in 2018/19.  
1.2 The audit program is based on Section 14 of the Public Sector Cyber Resilience
Framework which is called Business Continuity. The overall objective is to ensure
information security continuity shall be embedded in the organisation’s business
continuity management systems. 
Section 14 covers the following 6 areas, all of which will be included in the audit:
• data recovery capability, 
• backup policies and procedures, 
• disaster recovery policies and procedures, 
• business continuity & disaster recovery testing policies and procedures, 
• Data Protection Impact Assessments and 
• business continuity contingency plans.    
1.3 IT Services are responsible for the backup process within the Council’s data
centres.  Audit testing has been restricted to the IT backup process.  
1.4 A sample of business continuity plans that reference key IT systems were
selected for audit testing.  The same key IT systems were used to test Data
Protection Impact Assessment.   
2 Objectives and Scope  
2.1 The objectives of the audit were to ensure that:
• Recovery controls are in place to protect against information/data being lost or
compromised.
• Backup copies of information, software and system images shall be taken and
tested regularly.
• The Council has well defined and tested processes in place to ensure the
continuity of key operational services in the event of failure or compromise.
• Scenario-based exercises and processes to test recovery response plans are
planned and performed.
• DPIAs are undertaken to determine the impact of the intended processing on
the protection of personal data where the processing is likely to result in a high
risk to the rights and freedoms of individuals.  The DPIA should consider the
technical and organisational measures necessary to mitigate that risk.
• Contingency mechanisms are in place to continue to deliver services in the
event of any failure or compromise of any system or service.    
3 Findings   
Data Recovery Capability  
3.1 Site Recovery Manager (SRM) is the disaster recovery product used for Windows
servers and IT provided a list of what is managed via this process. This allows a

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quicker recovery of all servers on the list instead of restoring each server
individually.  There is a separate disaster recovery process in place for Unix
servers which also allows for a quicker recovery of such servers instead of
restoring each server individually.  The Council’s key IT systems have data
recovery capability.  There are a number of locally stored IT systems not covered
by the SRM or Unix disaster recovery process and there is no priority list to
decide which order these IT systems are recovered in the event of a major cyber
security event. (action a)  
3.2 The auditor reviewed the Site Recovery Manager list of servers and compared
this to the Commvault backup schedule report.  This test identified a server on
Site Recovery Manager that cannot be matched to a backup plan on the
Commvault backup schedules report.  IT has provided evidence this has now
been allocated to a backup plan.   
Backup Policies and Procedures  
3.3 Commvault Hyperscale is the backup product for on-premise infrastructure and IT
systems.  Data stored in the primary data centre is backed up to a secondary
data centre which is at a different physical location and a third copy is stored
offsite using a cloud product.  The secondary data centre also provides a second
site for data recovery capability in the event of a disaster but there is limited
capability at the second site.    
3.4 The auditor reviewed the Commvault schedules report which lists all servers, their
associated backup plan and evidence of when the last backup was taken.  The
auditor checked the backup process at a point in time and confirmed the backups
were successful.  However, it should be noted there were a number of servers
that were not allocated to a backup plan.  IT Services advised there is some
housekeeping required to clean up the Commvault schedule, most of which are
due to old servers that no longer need to be allocated to a backup plan but can
still be used to restore historical backups.  IT reviewed and cleaned the
Commvault schedule during the course of the audit and also advised that going
forward, ITSM requests should be made to decommission servers and this
includes a task to remove it from the backup plan.  
3.5 Commvault Metallic is the product which is used to provide additional offsite
backup for the M365 application data. This includes the back up of data for
Exchange, SharePoint, OneDrive and Teams.  This backup is taken every 8
hours and there is a Metallic Commvault console which is used to monitor and
control this backup process.  The auditor checked the status of this backup
process at a point in time and there were no findings to report. 
Disaster Recovery Policies and Procedures  
3.6 IT Services provided a copy of the Disaster Recovery (DR) plans overview
spreadsheet which lists 91 DR plans across the different areas within IT and it
also lists 650 historical DR plans.  Initially, there was information missing but IT
have since updated this to ensure the last review date for completed plans and
expected completion dates for incomplete plans are now recorded. There are 51
plans with the status ‘complete’ or ‘awaiting review’, 38 plans have the status
‘under development’ or ‘not started’ and 2 plans have no status recorded.  The

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Team Manager (Operations) advised the historical data will be deleted, this
spreadsheet will be moved to a SharePoint list and have a flow that will
automatically email plan owners at 12 months to review or remove if the solution
has been decommissioned.  In addition, monthly DR meetings are now scheduled
to progress the completion of outstanding DR plans. (action b)  
3.7 The DR plans reviewed by the auditor do not document the recovery time
objective (RTO) for the operational service.  The Team Manager (Operations)
advised this is difficult to calculate given the different scenarios that could impact
it but agreed an average RTO should be added to the DR plans.  (action c)   
BC/DR Testing Policies and Procedures  
3.8 IT Services have identified the need to test the backup and disaster recovery
processes on a quarterly basis.  Testing is planned to start in quarter 1 of 2024/25
for Windows Server test restore, Site Recovery Manager test recovery, Database
test restore, Unix server test restore and network device test restore.  Testing for
M365 test restore began in Q3 2023/24.  In addition, the planned Business
Continuity and Disaster Recovery Test Plan exercises have been rescheduled to
start again in 2024/25.  They have been delayed due to a vacant Team Manager
(ICT and Cyber Security) post that has now been filled.  (action d)   
Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIA)  
3.9 There is a Data Protection Impact Assessment SharePoint page on Connects
which provides information on this process and provides a link to the Data
Protection Impact Assessment Information and Guidance document; however,
this document was last reviewed and updated on 20th December 2018.
Information Governance advised this has been identified as needing to be
reviewed and updated.  (action e)  
3.10 Information Governance have recently introduced a DPIA tracker to allow all
DPIA’s to be recorded and monitored. This documents what stage they are at so
the team can be more proactive at chasing up outstanding actions and ensuring
annual reviews are carried out.  A review of the DPIA tracker identified a
significant backlog of completed DPIA’s awaiting sign off by the Data Protection
Officer. There were 56 completed DPIA’s waiting on being signed off at the time
of the audit.  There have been resourcing issues in the team which have since
been resolved.  (action f)  
3.11 A DPIA has not been completed for the CM2000 system.  This should be
completed retrospectively and passed to the Data Protection Officer to sign it off. 
(action g)  
3.12 A DPIA had not been completed for the CareFirst system.  Given that the
implementation of the replacement system (Eclipse) is not imminent, Information
Governance confirmed a DPIA for the CareFirst system should still be completed.  
A DPIA was completed during the course of the audit.  An older template has
been used and it has not yet been passed to the Data Protection Officer to sign it
off.  (action h)

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3.13 A DPIA has not been completed for the Civica system used by Housing Services
(this system was previously called Abritas). This should be completed
retrospectively and passed to the Data Protection officer to sign off.   (action i)  
3.14 A DPIA was completed for the Flexiroute system; however, this was completed in
an old format and was not signed off by the Data Protection Officer.  Information
Governance advised the DPIA should be reviewed, transferred to the new
template and passed to the Data Protection Officer to sign it off.  (action j)   
BC Contingency Plan  
3.15 The Council has a Business Continuity Management (BCM) Strategy in place,
however, this strategy was last updated in October 2015.  The Team Manager
(Risk) is aware of this and the document is currently being updated.  (action k)  
3.16 The Business Continuity Plan Template includes the threat scenario for the loss
of ICT. The template does not advise requesting a copy of the cloud provider’s
BC plan where the lead officer/plan owner has identified a cloud hosted system is
being used.
(action l)  
3.17 Internal Audit reviewed the Care at Home Business Continuity Plan to ensure the
CM2000 system is properly documented within this plan.  The plan was last
updated on 18/12/23 but this version should be saved in the Business Continuity
Management Hub. The Senior Manager (Locality Services) advised the provider
has been contacted more than once to request a copy of their business Continuity
plan as this is a cloud based system.  Once received, the Senior Manager
(Locality Services) has been advised to reference this document in the Care at
Home Business Continuity Plan.    
3.18 Internal Audit reviewed the Corporate Transport Hub Business Continuity Plan to
ensure the Flexiroute system is properly documented within this plan.  The plan
has not been updated since 15/11/21 and one of the response team members left
in August 2023. The Flexiroute system is not listed as one of the ICT
systems/applications under the Loss of IT section which means the details of
arrangements the service has in place if this system is not available has not been
recorded and the back-up storage information for this system has not been
recorded.  This is a cloud hosted system, but a copy of the cloud providers BC
plan has not been obtained and referenced in this BC plan.  (action m) 
4 Internal Audit Opinion  
4.1 Limited assurance was obtained with regards to the DPIA section of the audit due
to all 4 IT systems selected in the audit sample either having no DPIA in place or
no completed DPIA signed off by the DPO.  In addition, there is a significant
backlog of DPIA’s awaiting sign off by the Data Protection Officer to ensure the
DPIA’s have been reviewed and any necessary DPO advice provided.  
4.2 Reasonable assurance was obtained with regards to the other 5 sections of the
audit.  The recommendations made will assist the Council to strengthen the
response to a cyber security event, particularly in relation to a priority recovery list
for IT systems not covered by the SRM or Unix recovery process, outstanding DR

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plans being completed so they can be followed when needed, and rigorous
testing of the BC/DR process and the restore and recovery process.   
Definitions of Assurance Levels: 
Substantial
A sound system of governance, risk management and control exist, with
internal controls operating effectively and being consistently applied to
support the achievement of objectives in the area audited.
Reasonable
There is a generally sound system of governance, risk management and
control in place. Some issues, non-compliance or scope for
improvement were identified which may put at risk the achievement of
objectives in the area audited.
Limited
Significant gaps, weaknesses or non-compliance were identified.
Improvement is required to the system of governance, risk management
and control to effectively manage risks to the achievement of objectives
in the area audited.
None
Immediate action is required to address fundamental gaps, weaknesses
or non-compliance identified. The system of governance, risk
management and control is inadequate to effectively manage risks to the
achievement of objectives in the area audited. 
NB The level of assurance given is at the discretion of Internal Audit.

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KEY FINDINGS AND ACTION PLAN
CYBER RESILIENCE BUSINESS CONTINUITY 
Action a
Finding The Council’s key IT systems have data recovery capability. 
There are a number of locally stored IT systems not covered
by the SRM or Unix disaster recovery process and there is no
priority list to decide which order these IT systems are
recovered in the event of a major cyber security event.
Action Description IT Services in consultation with the Risk Manager should
compile an IT Corporate Systems list and facilitate a
discussion with ELT to enable a Corporate priority list for the
recovery of locally stored IT systems not covered by the SRM
or Unix disaster recovery process.
Risk No clear prioritised order for recovery could result in a delay
in the recovery of such systems.    
Priority (1, 2, 3) 2
Paragraph Reference  3.1
Managed by Fiona Walker, Head of Service (People & ICT)
Assigned to James McNeil, Senior Manager (ICT)
Due Date 31st October 2024
Management Comment All council systems are backed up by our Backup and
Recover solution, CommVault. However, Site Recovery
Manager can be used to quickly recover systems in the event
of a disaster scenario to our DR site. This is limited to 40
systems. IT will consult with the Risk Manager to compile a
list of systems that could be sorted into a prioritised list for
recovery. Once agreed, IT would then put the highest priority
systems on SRM and have a priority list for servers out with
SRM, “local”, to be restored in order that is beneficial to the
business. UNIX based applications are automatically covered
by the UNIX DR process. 
Action b
Finding There are 51 DR plans with the status ‘complete’ or ‘awaiting
review’, 38 plans have the status ‘under development’ or ‘not
started’ and 2 plans have no status recorded.  The Team
Manager (Operations) advised the historical data will be
deleted, this spreadsheet will be moved to a SharePoint list
and have a flow that will automatically email plan owners at
12 months to review or remove if the solution has been
decommissioned.  In addition, monthly DR meetings are now
scheduled to progress the completion of outstanding DR
plans.
Action Description IT Services should continue to progress the completion of
outstanding DR plans, ensure all DR plans have been
reviewed at least annually and delete historical DR data no
longer required.
Risk Having no DR plan or an out of date or inaccurate data in the
DR plan could result in a delay in the recovery process.
Priority (1, 2, 3) 2
Paragraph Reference  3.6

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Managed by Fiona Walker, Head of Service (People & ICT)
Assigned to James McNeil, Senior Manager (ICT)
Due Date Complete 
Management Comment SharePoint Document Library has now been created for
current and future DR plans. Document Library is set to
trigger an email to the plan owner when the last review date
hits 12 months to ensure the plans are reviewed again.
Legacy plans have been removed. IT continually work to
review and develop DR plans for systems. 
Action c
Finding The DR plans reviewed by the auditor do not document the
recovery time objective (RTO) for the operational service. 
The Team Manager (Operations) advised this is difficult to
calculate given the different scenarios that could impact it but
agreed an average RTO should be added to the DR plans.   
Action Description Realistic RTOs should be agreed and recorded in the DR
plans.
Risk If RTO’s are not known, services are not sure how long it will
take to recover the system or service and cannot plan
accordingly.
Priority (1, 2, 3) 2
Paragraph Reference  3.7
Managed by Fiona Walker, Head of Service (People & ICT)
Assigned to James McNeil, Senior Manager (ICT)
Due Date Complete
Management Comment Recovery Time objectives have now been added to current
DR plans and will be incorporated in all future plans that are
created. 
RTO (Single Server failure): Two Working Days
RTO (Full Failure | SRM/UNIX Replication): Five Working
Days
RTO (Full Failure | Backup Only): 8 to 12 Weeks 
Action d
Finding IT Services have identified the need to test the backup and
disaster recovery processes on a quarterly basis.  Testing is
planned to start in quarter 1 of 2024/25 for Windows Server
test restore, Site Recovery Manager test recovery, Database
test restore, Unix server test restore and network device test
restore.  Testing for M365 test restore began in Q3 2023/24. 
In addition, the planned Business Continuity and Disaster
Recovery Test Plan exercises have been rescheduled to start
again in 2024/25.  They have been delayed due to a vacant
Team Manager (ICT and Cyber Security) post that has now
been filled.  
Action Description IT Services should start completing the planned backup and
disaster recovery testing and ensure this testing is completed
at least quarterly.  The planned Business Continuity and
Disaster Recovery exercises should be recommenced as
soon as possible.

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Risk Issues identified at testing are not identified prior to a live
scenario; the necessary data is not available for recovery; the
backup cannot be relied upon to restore as expected. 
Priority (1, 2, 3) 2
Paragraph Reference  3.8
Managed by Fiona Walker, Head of Service (People & ICT)
Assigned to Gavin Alston, Team Manager (ICT & Cyber Security)
Due Date 30th June 2024
Management Comment IT have a Backup & Recovery testing schedule and tests
have been scheduled on a quarterly basis from April 2024.   
Action e
Finding There is a Data Protection Impact Assessment SharePoint
page on Connects which provides information on this process
and provides a link to the Data Protection Impact Assessment
Information and Guidance document; however, this document
was last reviewed and updated on 20th December 2018.
Information Governance advised this has been identified as
needing to be reviewed and updated.  
Action Description The Data Protection Impact Assessment Information and
Guidance document should be reviewed, updated and
reissued to ensure staff are aware of the need to complete
DPIA’s.
Risk It is not in line with industry best practice; out of date or
inaccurate information.
Priority (1, 2, 3) 2
Paragraph Reference  3.9
Managed by Aileen Craig, Head of Service (Democratic)
Assigned to Lauren Lewis, Data Protection Officer
Due Date Completed
Management Comment This action was in hand at the time of the audit. The action
has been completed and the 2024 version has been uploaded
to Connects. 
Mandatory Information Management training which is to be
undertaken by all staff on an annual basis highlighting
requirements, including criteria on when DPIAs are required is
in place. 
Action f
Finding A review of the DPIA tracker identified a significant backlog of
completed DPIA’s awaiting sign off by the Data Protection
Officer.  There were 56 completed DPIA’s waiting on being
signed off at the time of the audit.  
Action Description The Information Governance team should prioritise clearing
the backlog to ensure completed DPIA’s are signed off as
soon as possible.
Risk Potential non-compliance with Data Protection Legislation;
Council reputational damage; Council could be subject to
enforcement action by the Information Commissioner’s Office;

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Delays to improvement projects while awaiting sign off of the
DPIA.
Priority (1, 2, 3) 1
Paragraph Reference  3.10
Managed by Aileen Craig, Head of Service (Democratic)
Assigned to Lauren Lewis, Data Protection Officer
Due Date Completed
Management Comment The number of DPIAs received by the Information
Governance Team varies as business is put to the Team for
consideration and review. A number of these involve
consideration of complex and emerging issues which require
detailed investigation. The Information Governance team has
now been augmented to ensure that there are more staff
members in post to deal with DPIAs. The tracker has been
reviewed and updated to reflect the various stages of DPIAs
with the current levels of outstanding DPIAs for Information
Governance Team review being 18 (17 for DPO sign off and 1
for review). At the time of completion, 39 DPIAs have been
returned to Services for further feedback and updating with
relevant information. An online form is now live to log DPIA
requests via EMPro. This further facilitates both reporting
functionality and annual review processes for the Information
Governance Team; coupled with additional resource this will
enhance service performance and compliance in this area. 
Action g
Finding There is no DPIA for the CM2000 system.  
Action Description A DPIA should be completed retrospectively for the CM2000
system and this should be passed to the Data Protection
Officer to sign off.
Risk Non-compliance with Data Protection Legislation; Personal
data is at risk of misuse; Council reputation damage; Council
could be subject to enforcement action by the Information
Commissioner’s Office.
Priority (1, 2, 3) 1
Paragraph Reference  3.11
Managed by Kerry Logan, Head of Service (Health & Community Care)
Assigned to Lorraine Dyet (Senior Manager)
Due Date 30 April 2024
Management Comment The CM2000 Monitoring Officer within the HSCP is currently
progressing the completion of a DPIA, and is engaging with
the Data Protection Officer with the aim of completing this by
the end of April 2024. 
Action h
Finding A DPIA had not been completed for the CareFirst system.  A
DPIA was completed during the course of the audit.  An older
template has been used and it has not yet been passed to the
Data Protection Officer to sign it off.  
Action Description The DPIA should be transferred to the new template and
passed to the Data Protection Officer to sign off.

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Risk Non-compliance with Data Protection Legislation; Personal
data is at risk of misuse; Council reputation damage; Council
could be subject to enforcement action by the Information
Commissioner’s Office.
Priority (1, 2, 3) 1
Paragraph Reference  3.12
Managed by Paul Doak, Head of Service (HSCP Finance &
Transformation)
Assigned to Neil McLaughlin, Team Manager (Information Systems)
Due Date Complete
Management Comment The CareFirst system was introduced in North Ayrshire in
2001. The DPIA which was prepared during the course of the
audit has now been updated onto the new template and
signed off by the Data Protection Officer. 
Action i
Finding There is no DPIA for the Civica system used by Housing
Services. 
Action Description A DPIA should be completed retrospectively for the Civica
system used by Housing Services and this should be passed
to the Data Protection Officer to sign off.
Risk Non-compliance with Data Protection Legislation; Personal
data is at risk of misuse; Council reputation damage; Council
could be subject to enforcement action by the Information
Commissioner’s Office.
Priority (1, 2, 3) 1
Paragraph Reference  3.13
Managed by Yvonne Baulk, Head of Service (Housing & Public Protection)
Assigned to Fiona Ellis, Senior Manager (Housing Strategy &
Development)
Due Date 31/05/24
Management Comment The Digital team are actively working to pull together the DPIA
for the Civica system to coincide with a major system upgrade
and Trust Housing coming on board with the North Ayrshire
Housing Register (NAHR). 
The team are liaising with the Information Governance team
in preparing the draft DPIA which requires to be approved by
them in the first instance.  Input from the Registered and
Social Landlords that utilise the NAHR is also required and is
ongoing at present. 
Action j
Finding A DPIA was completed for the Flexiroute system; however,
this was completed in an old format and was not signed off by
the Data Protection Officer.  
Action Description The DPIA for the Flexiroute system should be reviewed,
transferred to the new template and passed to the Data
Protection Officer to sign it off.
Risk Non-compliance with Data Protection Legislation; Personal
data is at risk of misuse; Council reputation damage; Council

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could be subject to enforcement action by the Information
Commissioner’s Office.
Priority (1, 2, 3) 1
Paragraph Reference  3.14
Managed by Gordon Mitchell, Senior Manager (Transport)
Assigned to Susan Adamson, Team Manager (Journeys & Hires
/Transport)
Due Date 31/05/2024
Management Comment The original DPIA was transferred onto the appropriate new
format and passed to the Data Protection Officer to review
and signoff. However, this has since been returned with
comments and further recommendations. Due to the nature
and sensitivity of the Personal Information held, shared, and
processed, it was a recommendation of the DPO that the
completion of the DPIA should be supported with a
collaborative approach of Senior Managers from both the
Health & Social Care Partnership and Education and Youth
Employment as the key information providers. A meeting has
been arranged with representation from both services and the
Information Governance team with a view of a satisfactory
sign off by the end of May 2024. 
Action k
Finding The Council has a Business Continuity Management (BCM)
Strategy in place, however, this strategy was last updated in
October 2015.  The Team Manager (Risk) is aware of this,
and the document is currently being updated.  
Action Description Once the updated Business Continuity Management Strategy
has been agreed it should be reissued to ensure relevant staff
are aware the strategy has been reviewed and updated.
Risk It is not in line with industry best practice; out of date or
inaccurate information.
Priority (1, 2, 3) 2
Paragraph Reference  3.15
Managed by Mark Boyd, Head of Service (Finance)
Assigned to Alex Fitzharris, Team Manager (Risk & Insurance)
Due Date 29 November 2024
Management Comment The BCM strategy has been revised and reviewed and is
currently subject to further review and amendments ahead of
formal approval process. 
Action l
Finding The Business Continuity Plan Template includes the threat
scenario for the loss of ICT. The template does not advise
requesting a copy of the cloud provider’s BC plan where the
lead officer/plan owner has identified a cloud hosted system is
being used.
Action Description The Business Continuity Plan Template should be amended
to advise that where a cloud hosted system has been
identified, a copy of the cloud provider’s BC plan should be
obtained and referenced in the BC plan.

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Risk Cloud providers resiliency is not known; delay in recovering
from an incident.
Priority (1, 2, 3) 2
Paragraph Reference  3.16
Managed by Mark Boyd, Head of Service (Finance)
Assigned to Alex Fitzharris, Team Manager (Risk & Insurance)
Due Date 29 November 2024
Management Comment A working group will be set up with officers from across the
Council to revise the BC Plan Template approach considering
the release of the Business Continuity Institutes Good
Practice Guidelines 7.0 (2023).  The BC plan template
changes will be incorporated into the wider BCM Strategy
review work. 
Action m
Finding The Corporate Transport Hub Business Continuity has not
been updated since 15/11/21 and one of the response team
members left in August 2023.  The Flexiroute system is not
listed as one of the ICT systems/applications under the Loss
of IT section which means the details of arrangements the
service has in place if this system is not available has not
been recorded and the back-up storage information for this
system has not been recorded.  This is a cloud hosted
system, but a copy of the cloud providers BC plan has not
been obtained and referenced in the BC plan. 
Action Description The BC plan should be reviewed and updated to ensure the
response team members are current staff members.  The
Flexiroute system should be listed at the Loss of IT section to
ensure the details of arrangements the service has in place if
this system is not available is recorded.  The cloud provider
should be contacted to obtain a copy of their BC plan and this
should be referenced in this BC plan.
Risk Non-compliance with the BC strategy; new critical processes
have not been identified and documented; inaccurate or out of
date information could delay the response during an incident.
Priority (1, 2, 3) 2
Paragraph Reference  3.18
Managed by Gordon Mitchell, Senior Manager (Transport)
Assigned to Susan Adamson, Team Manager (Journeys & Hires
/Transport)
Due Date Completed
Management Comment The Business Continuity Plan has been reviewed and
updated which has been communicated and is reflective of
our current staffing structure. The Flexiroute system is now
listed under the Loss of IT section of the Business Continuity
Plan to ensure the details of arrangements are in place if the
team were to experience a Flexiroute system failure. The
system and cloud supplier (RLDatix) has provided a copy of
their BC plan and this is referenced in the teams Business
Continuity Plan.

Page 20

Priority Key used in Action Plan 
1 (High) Control weakness where there is a material impact on the achievement of
the control objectives, generally requiring prompt attention.
2 (Medium) Control weakness which needs to be rectified, but where there is no
material impact on the achievement of the control objectives.
3 (Low) Minor weakness or points for improvement.

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AGD – REVENUE PROJECTS 
1 Background  
1.1 The Ayrshire Growth Deal consists of a programme of 19 high-profile major
development projects across Ayrshire involving public, private and 3rd sector
partners and attracting funding from both Scottish and UK governments.  East
Ayrshire Council acts as the lead partner for the deal overall and hosts the Project
Management Office (PMO).  North Ayrshire Council is the lead partner for 9/19 of
the projects (6 capital, 3 revenue).  
1.2 The 3 Revenue Projects are Ayrshire-Wide but NAC is the lead partner for all of
them.  They are Community Wealth Building (CWB), Working for a Healthy
Economy (WfHE) and Ayrshire Skills Investment Fund (ASIF).  
1.3 The 3 projects are at very different stages.  ASIF has only relatively recently
received Final Business Case approval. Proposals include an employer grants
programme.   WfHE is largely undertaken by a contractor, NHS Salus, so the role
of NAC is mostly of contract management.  CWB was due to complete in March
2024, but an extension to March 2025 has recently been approved by the
Ayrshire Economic Joint Committee.     
2 Objectives and Scope  
2.1 The audit was structured as 3 mini-audits covering each of the revenue projects,
reflecting the different stages each audit had reached and the different natures of
the projects.  
2.2 The main objectives of the audit were to:
• Ensure that controls within the management of the Community Wealth
Building project are suitable and operating effectively.
• Ensure that controls to manage the contract for the delivery of Working for
a Healthy Economy are suitable and operating effectively.
• Provide audit advice regarding the proposals for the Ayrshire Skills
Investment Fund, including an employer grants scheme.  
2.3 Activities undertaken by East and South Ayrshire Councils as part of these
projects were not audited directly, although the audit reviewed assurances
obtained by NAC in relation to activities at East and South.   
3 Findings   
Community Wealth Building  
3.1 Overarching governance is provided by an AGD CWB Programme Steering
Group comprising representatives of the 3 Ayrshire local authorities. 
Performance and financial monitoring reports are regularly updated and
submitted to the PMO.  East and South Ayrshire Councils invoice North Ayrshire
quarterly to cover their share of the staff costs and business grants that they have

Page 22

distributed.  A risk register is kept in the Ideagen (formerly Pentana) system and
was updated during the audit period.    
3.2 A sample of 10 grants to businesses was checked and overall the applications
were all in order.  They were paid by payment request and the required proof of
bank details was not provided in 1 case or was inadequate in 4 further cases. 
The Business Support team, who process these claims, and the eProcurement
team were advised to ensure that suitable proof of bank details is included in the
payment requests. No other issues were identified.  
3.3 The 5 “top deliverable” performance indicators were checked to ensure that
suitable backup was available.  All were found to be suitable.  One of these
indicators is called “CWB Officers and Action Plans in Place” and is calculated by
adding together the number of officers in place and the number of action plans.  It
seems somewhat incongruous that these 2 figures are added together to form a
performance indicator.  North Ayrshire have contacted the PMO to query this
methodology.   
Working for a Health Economy  
3.4 This project is provided by a contractor appointed in a procurement exercise. 
There is a service level agreement and the agreed costs are invoiced monthly by
the contractor.    
3.5 There is a steering group where the partner organisations and the contractor
meet to discuss the progress on the project and any issues encountered. 
However, the steering group has not met regularly or, in some cases, meetings
have taken place but minutes have not been produced. (Action a)  
3.6 Performance data on people accessing support from this project are provided by
the contractor and reported to the PMO.  There is a risk register which has been
updated as the project progressed.   
Ayrshire Skills Investment Fund  
3.7 The ASIF project was at an early stage at the time of the audit.  The first round of
grants to businesses was awarded in November 2023 and a second round was
awarded near the end of the audit in February 2024.    
3.8 The Grant Offer Letter remitted to grant recipients outlines requirements for grant
recipients, including record keeping and accounting requirements.  The
businesses are required to sign and return a copy of the Grant Offer Letter. 
3.9 Since the UK left the EU the State Aid requirements have been replaced with
Minimum Financial Assistance requirements.  Processes have been introduced to
ensure that the grant recipients comply with these requirements.  
3.10 A small sample of grants awarded in November 2023 was checked and all was
found to be in order.  
3.11 The service requested some advice regarding evidence requirements for the
business grants.  They had been asking for invoices for external training and for

Page 23

training plans and hourly rates for in-house training.  Furthermore, they make
contact with all training recipients for monitoring and evaluation purposes, during
and after the training.  It was suggested that if the trainees do not engage
adequately to demonstrate that the training has taken place, then further
evidence should be requested from the businesses. 
4 Internal Audit Opinion  
4.1 Overall, substantial assurance was obtained with regard to the AGD Revenue
Projects.  The WfHE Steering Group meetings need to take place regularly and
minutes be produced promptly after each meeting.     
Definitions of Assurance Levels: 
Substantial
A sound system of governance, risk management and control exist, with
internal controls operating effectively and being consistently applied to
support the achievement of objectives in the area audited.
Reasonable
There is a generally sound system of governance, risk management and
control in place. Some issues, non-compliance or scope for
improvement were identified which may put at risk the achievement of
objectives in the area audited.
Limited
Significant gaps, weaknesses or non-compliance were identified.
Improvement is required to the system of governance, risk management
and control to effectively manage risks to the achievement of objectives
in the area audited.
None
Immediate action is required to address fundamental gaps, weaknesses
or non-compliance identified. The system of governance, risk
management and control is inadequate to effectively manage risks to the
achievement of objectives in the area audited. 
NB The level of assurance given is at the discretion of Internal Audit.

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KEY FINDINGS AND ACTION PLAN
AGD – REVENUE PROJECTS 
Action a
Finding The WfHE Steering Group has not met regularly or in some
cases meetings have taken place but minutes have not been
produced.
Action Description The Employability team should ensure that WfHE Steering
Group meets regularly and minutes of the meetings are
produced in a timely manner
Risk Issues with the project are not identified promptly.  Agreed
actions from the meetings are not implemented promptly. 
Different parties taking part in the meeting have a different
understanding of what was agreed.
Priority (1, 2, 3) 2
Paragraph Reference  3.5
Managed by Louise Kirk, Head of Service (Economic Development Growth
and Regeneration)
Assigned to Laura Neill, Senior Manager (Employability and Skills)
Due Date 6 June 2024
Management Comment The issue has partly been addressed through a schedule of
meeting dates which have been agreed with partners every 6
weeks. The next meeting is 30 May 2024. 
The next stage will be to ensure that an agenda is prepared at
least one week in advance and the meeting minutes issued
one week after the meeting date. This will be reviewed on 6
June 2024 to ensure compliance with the identified timescales
and the action can be closed thereafter. 
Priority Key used in Action Plan 
1 (High) Control weakness where there is a material impact on the achievement of
the control objectives, generally requiring prompt attention.
2 (Medium) Control weakness which needs to be rectified, but where there is no
material impact on the achievement of the control objectives.
3 (Low) Minor weakness or points for improvement.