Scrutiny Review Findings - Response to Severe Weather Events October 2023
Perth and Kinross Council · 18 December 2024
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Perth And Kinross Council Scrutiny And Performance Committee 18 December 2024 SCRUTINY REVIEW FINDINGS RESPONSE TO SEVERE WEATHER EVENTS OCTOBER 2023 Report by Strategic Lead – Legal and Governance (Report No. 24/368) 1. PURPOSE 1.1 The purpose of this report is to present the findings of the review by the Scrutiny and Performance Committee in relation to the Council’s response to the severe weather events in October 2023. It also seeks to provide assurance in terms of lessons learned and the implementation of improvement actions to ensure that the Council is equipped to respond effectively to future weather events. 2. STRUCTURE OF REPORT Section 2 – report structure Section 3 – Key findings Section 4 – Scope of the review Section 5 – Review process Section 6 – Context / Main Issues Section 7 – Findings Section 8 – Conclusion & recommendations Appendix 1 – Improvement action summary Appendix 2 - Summary of relevant reports and communications Appendix 3 – Roles and Responsibilities 3. KEY FINDINGS (ASSURANCE) (i) The Perth Flood Prevention Scheme (PFPS) has served Perth and Kinross Council well since its inception. The Scheme together with the associated operating model remains effective and fit for purpose (ii) The quality of the performance and decision-making in response to the extreme weather event of 6th-8Th October 2023 (in particular the decision in relation to the closure of floodgates) was impacted by a lack of resources; whilst illustrating areas for improvement, the response was not indicative of a systemic failure of the PFPS or associated operating model.
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(iii) The performance and decision-making in response to the subsequent Storm Babet and the severe weather events of 27th-29th October 2023 and 27th December 2023 was appropriate and effective; demonstrating that the operating model in place for managing emergencies (including weather events) is adequate and robust. (iv) The lessons learned from the operational response to the extreme weather event of 6th-8th October 2023 and the scrutiny process have resulted in the implementation of several improvement actions (see Appendix 1) (v) These improvements are reflected in the new “year-round” approach to weather incident management and response as set out in the report (24/217) approved by the Climate Change and Sustainability Committee on 21 August 2024. This approach will ensure that there are, to the best of our planning abilities, adequate resources and expertise available to respond to any future events. (vi) Community Resilience Groups played and will continue to play a crucial role in supporting the Council to respond to severe weather events. (vii) Prior to the October weather events there were approximately 10 active Community Resilience Groups. Since then, officers have been working to empower communities to create and build resilience within their local area. The Committee is delighted to note that the number of Community Resilience Groups across Perth and Kinross has risen to 56, which is a tremendous achievement and testament to our communities. It is important that all localities are encouraged and supported to form their own Groups so that together we can build the capacity to respond and protect our communities across the whole area. (viii) More general facts and findings which are set out in section below 7 below. (ix) The issue of liability is one to be determined by the Council’s insurers and therefore does not form part of the Findings of this review. 4. SCOPE OF THE REVIEW 4.1 The scope of this Review has been shaped by: • issues identified by officers as part of routine internal review process following a major event/incident; • concerns expressed by individuals and businesses at the public meeting in the Civic Hall on 15th November 2023 following the extreme weather event experienced on the weekend of 6-8th October; • deputations made to the Scrutiny and Performance Committee on 22 November 2023;
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• feedback/questions from elected members; and • specific issues identified by or referred to the Scrutiny and Performance Committee. 4.2 Whilst the main focus of the public and press attention has been on the extreme weather event of the 6-8th October 2023, Perth and Kinross experienced two further severe weather events in October; • 18th-21st October 023 (Storm Babet) • 27th-29th October 2023 The Scrutiny and Performance Committee also considered the Council’s response to the weather event on 27th December, given that occurred during the festive closedown period, for completeness. 4.3 The Review has therefore considered the Council’s preparedness and response to those events, in terms of evidence of lessons learned from the 6- 8th October 2023 and subsequent events and to seek assurance as to the robustness of the Council processes, controls and capacity to respond effectively to future severe weather events. 4.4 The areas of focus for the review are summarised as follows: (i) General preparedness for dealing with severe weather events; adequacy of Council systems and procedures (ii) Partnership working and data sharing with reference to SEPA, Scottish Water and SSE Renewables (iii) Incident management, resourcing and response to the extreme weather event of 6-8th October including timing and decision making in relation to flood gate closures (iv) Lessons learned from October 2023 weather events (v) Improvement action and assurance 4.5 At the public meeting on 15th November 2023 and subsequently, residents and businesses have also raised the issue of insurance and liability for damage to properties that may have been impacted by the late closure of some flood gates. The Committee has been advised and is satisfied that the issue of liability is one to be determined by the Council’s insurers and therefore does not form part of the Findings of this review. 4.6 The Council has acknowledged in the report to Scrutiny and Performance Committee in November 2023 (23/323) that the delay in closing the floodgate on the North Inch may have been a contributory factor to the extent of the flooding experienced by a small number of the properties.
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4.7 All claims for damage to property have been managed entirely through the Council’s insurers and their respective solicitors; no claims have been assessed or processed directly by the Council. 4.8 The Scrutiny and Performance Committee understand that Council’s insurers have carried out their own independent assessment to determine what, if any, impact the delay in closing the gates had on each of the affected properties. We understand that the insurers have accepted that the failure to close floodgates likely impacted the extent of the flood damage experienced in relation to a small number of the total properties affected; and that settlement offers have already been or are due to be made. 4.9 The Scrutiny Review can make no further comment on the matter of liability. 5. REVIEW PROCESS 5.1 The Scrutiny Review process has been one of active listening, data gathering, assessment and analysis. Members of the Committee have considered and critically assessed information and reports presented by officers, partner agencies, members of the public and other elected members. All elected members have also been given the opportunity to site visit the Perth Flood Prevention Scheme to better understand how it operates. 5.2 Chronology Doc links 6-8th Oct 2023 Extreme weather event 18th-21st Oct 2023 Storm Babet 27th-29th Oct 2023 Severe weather event 15th Nov 2023 Public Meeting with affected residents and businesses 22nd Nov 2023 Special Meeting of Scrutiny & Performance Committee – review of weather events Report 22 November 2023 Appendix 1 - Incident Planning - Standby Arrangements Appendix 2 - Improvement Plan Appendix 3 - Flood Gate Location Map Minute of Meeting of Scrutiny and Performance Committee 22 November 2023 27 Dec 2023 Severe weather event
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31 Jan 2024 Scrutiny and Performance Committee - update Update report 31 January 2024 Appendix 1 - Improvement Plan Minute of Meeting of the Scrutiny and Performance Committee of 31 January 2024 24 April 2024 Scrutiny and Performance Committee- weather events – improvement plan Weather Events - Improvement Plan Minute of Meeting of the Scrutiny and Performance Committee of 24 April 2024 22 May 2024 Site visit to Flood Prevention Scheme – all member visit 12 June 2024 Scrutiny and Performance Committee- Overview of improvement activity Extreme Weather Events Review - Overview of Activity Minute of Meeting of the Scrutiny and Performance Committee of 12 June 2024 9 August 2024 Scrutiny Review Q&A with SEPA 21 Aug 2024 Climate Change & Sustainability Committee – All year weather event response Year-Round Weather Event Response Appendix 1 - Civil Contingencies Act Appendix 2 - Partner Agencies Appendix 3 - Flooding Contingency Systems Appendix 4 - Alignment with Extreme Weather Events Review Improvement Plan Appendix 5 - Council Response Examples Roads Maintenance Partnership Appendix 6 - Council Response Examples - Flooding
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Minute of Meeting of the Climate Change and Sustainability Committee of 21 August 2024 28 Aug 2024 Economy and Infrastructure Committee -Road Gully Cleansing Road Gully Cleansing Appendix 1 - Previous Cleanse Monitor Outputs Appendix 2 - Cleanse Monitor 2023 Appendix 3 - Visual Representation Minute of Meeting of the Economy and Infrastructure Committee of 28 August 2024 12 Sept 2024 Scrutiny Review Q&A with: Scottish Water SSE Renewables 18 Sept 2024 Scrutiny and Performance Committee – partner presentations Presentation - SEPA Home | Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) Presentation - SSE Renewables A Better World of Energy | SSE Renewables Presentation - Scottish Water Home - Scottish Water Minute of Meeting of the Scrutiny and Performance Committee of 18 September 2024 6th Nov2024 Scrutiny Review – Workshop to consider findings and agree and further recommendations
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6. CONTEXT/ MAIN ISSUES 6.1 Perth and Kinross experienced three severe weather events during October 2023: • 6th-8th October; • 18th- - 21st October (Storm Babet); and • 27th-29th October. A further severe weather event occurred on 27th December 2023 6.2 The extreme event of the 6th-8th October highlighted issues as regards the Council’s resources and preparedness which in turn raised concerns as regards our ability to respond effectively to future weather events. 6.3 Elected Members, with the full support of the Chief Executive, asked that Scrutiny and Performance Committee carry out a review to consider the response and decision-making with particular reference to 6th-8th October event. The purpose being to review the adequacy and effectiveness of the systems and processes in place and to identify and monitor implementation of any improvement actions. 6.4 The Council has long-standing and effective processes for managing civil contingencies, emergency planning, and business continuity. These processes include a concurrent risk approach, which considers the possibility of multiple incidents occurring simultaneously. This approach covers scenarios such as severe weather, power outages, civil unrest, and cyber- attacks. 6.5 Outwith normal working hours, the Council has an emergency duty rota in place which operates 365 days a year, 7 days per week and 24 hours per day. A pager service is operated out with working hours and covered by a team of 5 Emergency Response Duty Officers (ERDOs). A number of Council staff from across the organisation are part of a rota which is the first point of call, via a dedicated pager number, to ensure rapid activation of the Council’s response protocols as required. Members of the Executive Leadership Team are on a rota ready to respond 24 hours a day, 365 days a year to lead the Council response to an emergency if required. To ensure resilience in terms of senior strategic leadership for emergencies and incidents, all Strategic Leads are undertaking the necessary training and will be included on this rota going forward. This is in addition to the Council’s normal out of hours services for individual and routine incidents. 6.6 The Council’s internal arrangements are also supplemented by long- established relationships and formal arrangements through the Tayside Local Resilience Partnership, with partner agencies including Police Scotland, Scottish Fire and Rescue Services (SFRS), SEPA, Scottish Water, NHS Tayside as well as Dundee and Angus Councils. Resilience is also supported by strong and effective relationships with Community Resilience Groups (CRGs), made up of local volunteers prepared to support their local area during emergency situations, including weather.
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6.7 In terms of severe weather planning Perth and Kinross Council have traditionally focussed on winter weather risks and therefore operated a Winter Maintenance Policy deploying increased “on call” resources to ensure appropriate staffing for winter weather incidents. This was in place from the 3rd week in October throughout the winter period. 6.8 The extreme weather incident on 6th -8th October 2023 occurred at the start of the October School holidays and mid-way during the school holidays of our neighbouring Tayside Councils. It was also just before the Winter Maintenance Policy was due to be applied (from which point, holidays were ordinarily curtailed in relation to trained operatives, to ensure optimal cover arrangements during the winter period). The timing therefore had a significant impact in terms of available staff resources given the scale and intensity of the weather event. 7. GENERAL FACTS/FINDINGS 7.1 The Perth and Kinross Council area is highly susceptible to (and has a long history of) flooding from the River Tay. To help manage this risk, the Council has had a Flood Prevention Scheme (so named as the governing legislation at the time was the Flood Prevention Act 1961) since 2001. 7.2 The Perth Flood Prevention Scheme (PFPS) does not and cannot prevent flooding. Its purpose is to help mitigate the impact of flooding from the River Tay. This has been recognised within the current legislative framework which now refers, more appropriately, to Flood Protection Schemes. 7.3 The Scheme is managed on behalf of the Council by the Roads Maintenance Partnership (RMP). Within the PFPS there are 77 floodgates/barriers (79 if you include 2 special gates at Queens Bridge and the Promontory at Tay Street); of which 10 flood gates (barriers) are permanently closed and a further 10 are closed seasonally from October through to the end of March. 7.4 The Perth Flood Protection Scheme Operating Manual sets out the specific processes for the operation of the flood gates /barriers and the “triggers” for closure. Within the Scheme there are 12 gate closure plans to deal with varying levels of flooding risk. 7.5 As the section of the River Tay flowing through Perth is affected by both fluvial flow and tides, the gate closure protocols are based on a set of parameters using flow and tide including surge) data supplied by Scottish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA). 7.6 SEPA play an integral role in the Perth Flood Protection Scheme. Recognising the particular challenges and flood risks in the area, SEPA supply not only flow and tide data, but they also provide specific warning services to PKC which are set out in the Scheme Operating Manual.
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7.7 There is no direct correlation between SEPA flood warnings and Met Office weather warnings. Flood gate closure protocols are not therefore triggered by the issuing of specific weather warnings (with the exception of the barriers at the South Inch which due to the level of flooding risk posed by surface water (not from the River itself), gates are closed on the issue of a Met Office Yellow weather warning as a precaution). 7.8 SEPA are the ‘warn and inform’ agency for Scotland in terms of providing the Scottish Flood Forecasting Service (in partnership with the Met Office). This uses a network of over 250 rainfall, river and coastal monitoring stations across Scotland to generate data 24 hours a day. When this data is combined with meteorological data from the Met Office, it is used to produce the predictions of river, coastal and surface water flooding. These predictions are communicated to the Council and other organisations via the national Flood Guidance Statement, and ultimately via the Flood Alerts, Warnings and Severe Warnings to specific areas. 7.9 The weather event experienced from the 6th -8th October 2023 was extreme and unexpected; with the Met Office only issuing an Amber warning for heavy rain on the 6th of October itself. Similarly in the week leading up to the 6th of October the daily Flood Guidance Statement via SEPA’s Scottish Flood Forecasting Service had the risk as very low/low/low for the 6th, 7th and 8th October, respectively. 7.10 It was not until the 6th of October itself that the risk level elevated to very low/ medium/ medium respectively for these three days. At that point incident management preparations were commenced. Unfortunately, this weekend was the start/mid-way point of the October Schools holidays across Tayside and prior to the implementation of the Council’s Winter Maintenance Plan (during which leave is restricted). Several staff who would normally manage such incidents were therefore on leave and some were out of the country on holidays. Despite a considerable number of staff from within the Council’s Parking & Civil Contingencies Team and the Roads Maintenance Partnership coming in off their holidays or volunteering to provide additional cover to support the response, the scale and intensity of the weather event was such that there was inadequate staffing capacity to deal with the prolonged incident. 7.11 Those resource pressures led to the operational decision being taken not to close certain floodgates. The decision was a pragmatic risk-based decision taking into account the data from SEPA available at that time and assessment of the situation on the ground. With the benefit of hindsight, in relation to the floodgates on the North Inch, this was the wrong decision and (as acknowledged in the initial report to Scrutiny and Performance Committee in November 2023) may likely have contributed to the degree of flood damage sustained by a small number of the total properties affected.
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7.12 The new “Year-Round” Weather Event Response which was approved by the Climate Change and Sustainability Committee in August recognises that, given the changing weather patterns, flooding presents the most likely year- round risk. Based on the learning from the extreme event of the 6th-8th October 2023: • Warning and trigger levels form the have been reviewed and remain appropriate • Council owned telemetry and site alarms and triggers have been reviewed • Floodgates within the PFPS have been assessed to consider the viability of automation, which is not deemed a practical or cost effective solution • lightweight contingency flood barriers in two different types (Boxwall and Watergate) have been purchased and can be deployed at different locations. • Officers are still working to identify appropriate lightweight barriers systems to replace the heavy Promontory and Queens Bridges systems 7.13 On the particular issue of staffing resource: • Parking and Civil Contingencies officers and Community wardens are now trained and can assist with gate closures if required and provide support on the ground • During their Monday- Sunday working hours, Waste and greenspace operatives will also be redirected to assist with clearance of trash screens 7.14 In the course of this review, concerns have been expressed about the quality of the data shared with the Council by SEPA which in turn influenced the decision not to close the floodgates; with speculation that the dramatic increase in the flow rate reported by SEPA in the early hours of the 7th October data during may have been due to water “being released” from Pitlochry dam by SSE Renewables. From engagement with SSE Renewables the Review obtained a better understanding as to the dam operations and learned that the dam is designed to release water when it reaches a certain level. No human decision-making or intervention is involved in this process. Whilst SSE Renewables are not a Category 2 Responder in terms of the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) they do provide data to SEPA to support them in their duty to “Warn and Inform”. The Committee understands that amongst the partners, the general consensus is that the weather system remained across Perth for many hours longer than anticipated based on Met Office data that was available to them. This in turn impacted upon the assumptions feeding the data provided by SEPA and guiding operations on the ground. 7.15 Flooding is complex, with impacts arising from various water sources. Each flood is unique: some stem from rivers, others from extreme rainfall causing runoff and overwhelming drainage systems, and some are a mix of both. In Perth, the River Tay poses a significant flood risk to nearby properties.
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However, properties not directly affected by the Tay can still experience flooding if drainage systems back up when river levels are high. This can cause water to surface at road gullies, manholes, or inside properties. In some cases, for example Bells Sports Centre, there is the risk of flooding from the river due to its location, but it is also prone to flooding due to drainage infrastructure. Since 2017 Bells Sports Centre has suffered five notable flood events with varying degrees of impact, where with the exception of the October 2023 event, the appropriate deployment of floodgates has not been in question. 7.16 The PFPS primarily reduces direct flooding from the Tay, but rainfall can still cause flooding behind the PFPS. This is due to the fact that higher than usual water levels in the Tay (even when it is not flooding itself) can limit discharge from surface water sewers or extreme weather events exceeding the capability of the surface water drainage systems to convey water away. Property owners should consider Property Flood Resilience measures like non-return valves and flood gates to mitigate this risk. 7.17 Scottish Water informed the Scrutiny and Performance Committee that local drainage and sewerage infrastructure, like the rest of the country, was not designed for the increasing volume of severe wet weather events. Their design standards differ from the Council's, with Scottish Water following the 'Sewers for Scotland v4' document and the Council adhering to the 'Delivering Sustainable Flood Risk Management' Guidance 2019. Scottish Water is investing in upgrading sewers and Waste Water Treatment Works, but this investment alone cannot solve the national infrastructure problem. The Super Sewer upgrade on Tay Street and Shore Road introduces additional sewerage conveyance capacity that may relieve a small amount of localised flooding from sewers but is focussed on supporting the city’s continuing growth and reducing the number of properties affected by backing up of the Scottish Water drainage systems. It is not expected to have capacity to take flood waters from the River Tay. 7.18 The weather event of the 6th-8th October 2023 also raised concerns as regards the Council’s response to calls for assistance. The Council contracts with Aberdeen City Council Customer Contact Centre to support the operation of emergency contact lines for roads, flooding and housing repairs. In line with the agreed process, Aberdeen City were contacted on 6 October to request that they arranged additional resources to support the answering of calls from Perth and Kinross given the amber weather warning. 7.19 Over the 7th-8th October, Aberdeen Council Customer Contact Service (ACCCS) received 615 calls made to PKC out of hours numbers (many of which would have been repeat calls). ACCC responded to 257 calls of which 145 were to housing repairs reporting low-level weather-related leaks. As there were several severe weather events occurring in different parts of the country, the volume of calls impacted upon the ability of ACCCS to respond. 7.20 It is recognised however that it would be impossible to resource a contact centre to be able to immediately respond to every call placed during severe
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weather event or indeed any other emergency. Instead, more proactive work will be done to issue information to the public via other channels and to support the public to only use the out of hours numbers for emergencies (as opposed to reporting an issue or simply seeking advice). This will enable the ACCCS to direct their resources where they are most needed. 7.21 The Council’s response to Storm Babet (18th-21st October) and the severe event of 27th-29th October 2023 was in line with agreed operating protocols and was robust and effective. No specific improvement actions were identified as a result of the Council’s response to those events. 7.22 A query was also raised as to whether some assurance could be given regarding the flooding in Invergowrie as a result of the Balruddery Burn embankment/causeway failure. The Committee are advised that the failure of the earth embankment/ causeway increased the extent and severity of flooding both locally and in the downstream catchment area which includes Invergowrie. 7.23 The earth embankment in question, sat within Angus Council’s administrative area. The Committee are advised that Angus Council have contacted the landowner who has confirmed that there are no plans to reinstate the embankment /causeway. Furthermore, any such structure would likely require a licence from SEPA under The Water Environment (Controlled Activities) (Scotland) Regulations 2011. 7.24 Officers cannot advise the Committee to what degree Invergowrie or other areas would have been flooded had the embankment not existed. This is however something which residents’ insurers will be looking to determine when processing claim for damage to property. From an assurance perspective however, Officers are satisfied that that the significant threat came from the fact that floodwater was able to build up behind the earth embankment which then gave way, releasing a significant volume of water into the Balruddery Burn in a short period of time. In the absence of that structure being reinstated, the risk of that same situation occurring in the future is minimal/nil. 7.25 The weather events experienced throughout October 2023 also highlighted an issue regarding communication and connectivity with our more rural communities. The Committee accepts that this is not something within the direct control of the Council and that the responsibility for addressing this issue sits with the relevant mobile network operators. 8. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 8.1 The Committee firmly put on record their thanks to all those residents and community resilience groups who respond to severe weather events, and to all residents and communities who step up to help their neighbours in time of need.
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8.2 The Scrutiny and Performance Committee wish to thank officers, residents and representatives from local businesses, SEPA, Scottish Water, SSE Renewables and other elected members for their input into this review process. 8.3 The Council’s response to the Storm Babet (18th -21st October 2023) and to the severe weather events of 27th-29th October 2023 and 27th December 2023 was robust and effective. 8.4 As has already been acknowledged publicly by both the Chief Executive and the then Executive Director for Communities in their capacity as Incident Gold Commander for that event, with hindsight, the decision not to close the floodgates as per the protocol was the wrong decision. The Committee acknowledges the resource pressures experienced that weekend and accepts that officers took a risk-based decision, taking into account the data available to them at the time, their professional knowledge and experience and an assessment of the situation on the ground. Nonetheless the Committee agrees that the decision not to close the floodgates was, with hindsight, the wrong decision. 8.5 In terms of assurance however the Committee are satisfied based on the response to subsequent severe weather events. That the Council’s response to the extreme weather event of the 6th- 8th October was anomalous and not indicative of systemic failure of either the Perth Flood Prevention Scheme and the associated operating procedures, or of the Council’s operating model for management of incidents and emergencies. 8.6 The Committee are satisfied that, whilst unfortunate, inadequate staffing resources over that weekend and the unexpected severity of the weather event undermined the quality of our response on that occasion. 8.7 The Committee are pleased to note that lessons have been learned from the 6th-8th October event and that the opportunity has been taken to review and refine operating arrangements for the management of severe weather events. In particular it welcomes: i. The strengthening of the partnership working and data sharing between the Council, SEPA, Scottish Water and SSE Renewables ii. The development of a Year-Round Weather Response Plan which was designed to address the changing weather patterns but will also ensure that the Council is adequately resourced to respond effectively to weather events regardless of when the occur. iii. The establishment of 46 new Community Resilience Groups iv. The additional incident management/emergency response leadership capacity at senior level v.
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8.8 Further recommendations: i. Whilst the issue of poor/no mobile phone connectivity in certain parts of the Council areas is not something within the direct control or influence of the Council, officers are asked to continue to engage with mobile network operators to try to identify a solution. ii. Acknowledging the £175k which the Council’s Finance and Resources Committee has put into reserves to support the establishment of Community Resilience Groups, officers are asked to continue working with communities to establish new groups across all Council areas. Authored on behalf of the Scrutiny and Performance Committee Name Designation Contact Details Lisa Simpson Strategic Lead – Legal & Governance Services legalservices@pkc.gov.uk